Indijsko nedavno predsedavanje G20: Nove paradigme u kulturnoj diplomatiji
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28 May 2024
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14 June 2024
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28 June 2024
Apstrakt
Integracija kulturne diplomatije sa javnom politikom postala je od interesa za spoljnu politiku, kako su se pojavile norme i vrednosti kao determinante projekcije moći. Od formalizacije „Meke moći“ od strane Džozefa Naja, dobila je izuzetan značaj u proučavanju „Moći“ i njenog uticaja na aktere. Istorijski gledano, kamen temeljac indijske analize meke moći
su svest o identitetu među široko rasprostranjenom dijasporom i indijski pristup partnerima Pokreta nesvrstanih kroz državni aparat. Indijsko predsedavanje G20 tokom 2023. godine prikazalo je indijske kulturne manifestacije, definišući njenu ulogu u pružanju rešenja i građenju konsenzusa, dok se obraćala svojim ključnim biračima. U radu se razmatra kulturna diplomatija tokom indijskog predsedavanja G20 tokom 2023. godine i kritični pokazatelji meke moći.
Članak
INTRODUCTION
In July 2023, on the sidelines of the ‘Energy Transitions’ Ministerial, the G-20 Secretariat dropped the phrase written in Sanskrit in Devnagari script, ‘Vasidhaiva Kutumbakam’ on the logo of the G20 summit in India. This move was attributed to China’s alleged opposition to the claim that Sanskrit is not a United Nations language. Later, its English translation of ‘One Earth, One Planet, One Family’ was adopted as the official English translation and theme of the G20 Summit in India (Singh, 2023). In April 2023, China opposed the mention of MAHARISHI (Millets and Other Ancient Grains International Research Initiative), at the G20 Meeting of Agricultural Chief Scientists (MACS). (Mukharjee, 2023) The term ‘Maharishi’ means a ‘Sage’ in Sanskrit and several Indian languages. Food and Agricultural Organization, a specialized agency, oversaw 2023 as the International Year of Millets, as UNGA declared 2023 the International Year of Millets(UNGA Res. A/75/pv.56). India is the largest millet produced, and the IYM coincided with India’s Presidency of the G20. The Chinese objections reflect the minute observations by China, over the civilizational manifestations of India at this time.
The primary challenge of Constructivist scholarship to traditional determinants of international relations theory challenges the significance of events, in studying international relations. Constructivism emphasizes the ‘processes over the ‘outcome’, focusing on norms and their impact on power dynamics in the shaping of International Relations (Ulbert et al., 2014). The collapse of the Soviet Union followed the global spread of liberal democracy, making democratization essential for accessing global markets and institutions. While events remain crucial in international relations today, there is also substantial interest in the processes they drive. Norms carry cultural weight and reflect a state’s character, and the society it represents. Joseph Nye argues that, it primarily operates through attraction linked to societal values, cultural influence, and domestic political structures rather than just propaganda (Nye, 2008). Identity has become increasingly important within globalization, amid migration trends, despite non-rational factors like gender roles or climate change influencing norms underpinning International Relations. During its leadership of the G20 summit, India’s widespread outreach efforts raised awareness about the goals and purposes of multilateral groupings. As the world’s most populous country, this campaign captured significant international attention at multiple levels, marking a notable achievement in presenting India’s cultural diplomacy within regional and global contexts.
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION FOR SOUTH ASIA AND THE ‘GLOBAL SOUTH’
Indian Prime Ministers have frequently used the phrase ‘Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam’, derived from the ancient text of Maha Upanishad in India (Kar, 2023). The phrase resonates with various spiritual cults that evolved in the subcontinent. In 2002, Atal Bihari Vajpayee engaged the term, at a meeting of the National Human Rights Institutions of the Asia Pacific Forum to emphasize that India’s understanding and advocacy of human rights, are as universal as they are ancient (PMO, 2002). In 2007, Manmohan Singh used the term to defend India’s approach to climate change and global warming while acknowledging its global responsibility at the Heiligendamm G-8 summit (PMO, 2007). Prime Minister Narendra Modi also cited this phrase during his maiden address to the United Nations about expanding UN Security Council membership (WPS Sidhu, 2017). Furthermore, in 2018, PM Modi reiterated this concept of inclusion in global markets, while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos (SansadTV, 2018).
Similarly, in June 2014, Prime Minister Modi referred to the phrase, Vasudhaiva Kutumbhakam’, whilst addressing the launch of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), and emphasized that a satellite for SAARC Nations would be launched soon (Khanna & Moorthy, 2017). In May 2017, GSAT-9, of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), was launched, providing critical support in telecommunications, tele-education, and financial services to benefactor SAARC nations (Venkatasubramanian, 2017). India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ orientation, gained renewed attention when Prime Minister Narendra Modi extended invitations to all SAARC members for the swearing-in of his first cabinet in 2014 in New Delhi,
resulting in a gathering of South Asian heads of state. The Bhutan Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay termed the meeting a ‘Mini-SAARC’ (NDTV, 2014). India’s focus on its ‘Neighbourhood First’ external policy under Prime Minister Modi was evident again, when Bangladesh was invited to the G20 summit due to its crucial role in both SAARC and BIMSTEC (Bhattacherjee, 2023).
The ISRO Telemetry, Tracking & Command Network operates three International stations in Brunei, Indonesia, and Mauritius. In 2001, India established the India-Myanmar Friendship Centre for Remote Sensing. Furthermore, in 2015, Indian PM Narendra Modi proposed building of ground space station in Vietnam while addressing the India-ASEAN meeting at Nay Pyi Taw in Myanmar. (Dikshit, 2021) The flexing of ‘Vasuthaiva Kutumbhakam’ reached the highest peak when it was engraved at the entrance of the newly built Indian Parliament building inaugurated on 5 June 2023. This civilizational manifestation gained much political traction in the grammar of power flexing. India has previously demonstrated its ‘Neighbourhood
First Policy’ in global events before the G-20. During India’s Presidency in 2016, the BRICS summit occurred in Goa, where India successfully hosted the BRICS-BIMSTEC summit, on its sidelines (Faleiro, 2016). BIMSTEC was established in 1997 with primarily Indian Ocean littoral states, including Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, and later expanded its membership. This geopolitical framework excludes Pakistan and reflects India’s objectives and interests in South Asia beyond SAARC.
Public diplomacy in Asia has gained momentum due to the Internet’s widespread use and social media’s emergence. China’s efforts to host the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008 marked a shift towards integrating global events with power projections in Asia. A state’s resources and capabilities determine the components of soft power. In India’s cultural diplomacy, it is crucial to consider its political communication aimed at connecting with South Asia and other countries in the Global South. These nations were part of an informal coalition within the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War era. The Ministry of External Affairs established its Public Diplomacy Wing in 2006, and it first engaged on social media platforms in
2010. Its objectives have since focused on engaging with diaspora communities and populations from developing countries, expanding foreign policy outreach beyond New Delhi’s diplomatic circles through new media channels (Khanna & Moorthy, 2017).
A multitude of layers and complexities characterizes contemporary public diplomacy. The rise of social media has prompted Foreign Policy professionals to expand their thinking beyond traditional methods, driven by the influence of social media algorithms. According to Joseph Nye, cultural diplomacy consists of two aspects: high culture, which encompasses art, literature, and books, and popular culture, which revolves around mass entertainment (Nye, 2008). By examining India’s Cultural Diplomacy through this lens, we can observe its initiatives to promote classical arts, language, and customs as part of efforts related to High Culture. India’s mainstream cinema in the Hindi language (commonly referred to as Bollywood) has captured the world’s attention, and its heritage sites and spiritual destinations make India a popular destination. Despite widespread fascination with Indian culture and heritage internationally, it does not rank highly in Soft Power Indexes compiled by various organizations (Bajpai, 2021). One primary reason is that soft power projections also require substantial resources. China’s focused allocation into development is disparate from what India engages in in terms of highest priority, focusing concentration towards achieving objectives. They have effectively utilized Confucius Institutes to channel resources to advance Chinese soft power goals within foreign policy objectives.
With the emergence of a broader power matrix, the new term that came to the fore was ‘Smart Power’. As Joseph Nye continuously improvised his theory of Soft Power, the term ‘Smart Power’ was first mentioned by Hilary Clinton in 2008 as Secretary of State. It calibrates Soft Poweer objectives with Hard Power (Viswanathan, 2009). Military and economy remain the foremost indicators of absolute power. However, Soft Power derivatives provide legitimacy and acceptability to the hard power. Scholars have demonstrated their arguments by dwindling US popularity among its partners like Mexico and Turkey, who refused to side with the US to intervene in Iraq as part of the Global War on Terror (Nye, 2008). The endorsement of this concept of Smart Power in discussions about Norms, Power, and Diplomacy may lead to fresh developments in executing Foreign Policy. Shrey Khanna and P Moorthy suggest that combining soft power elements such as financial assistance, rapid emergency response, infrastructure support for training, and joint military exercises with traditional military operations is essential. During the Tsunami Operation in 2004, the Indian Navy dispatched a total of 32 naval ships, seven aircraft, and 20 helicopters, to carry out five relief and reconstruction missions called Operation Madad, Operation Sea Waves, Operation Custor, Operation Rainbow, and Operation Gambhir (MHS, 2023).
The Indian Maritime Doctrine released by the Indian Navy in 2009 (Indian Maritime Strategy) points out: “Navy’s mission in the diplomatic role must be enhanced to promote regional & global security such as maritime assistance and support, the military task of Out of Area Contingency (OOAC) & Non-Combat Evacuation Operations (NEO)” (Khanna & Moorthy, 2017). In 2013, while laying the foundation stone for the Indian National Defense University at Gurugram, the former Prime Minister of India pointed out: “To assume our responsibility for stability in Indian Ocean Region… We are well positioned to become a net security provider in our immediate region & beyond” (PIB, 2013).
In 2015, India launched a relief operation called Operation Rahat. Forty-one countries, including the US and the UK, sought India’s help evacuating their Citizens (The Hindu, 2016). In 2019, the Indian Navy launched an annual joint military exercise with the Navy of Bangladesh as “Bongo-SAGAR”. India’s foreign policy has evolved significantly in recent years, showcasing a strategic focus on fostering strong regional and global partnerships. The Project Mausam, initiated by the Government of India, aims to revive and strengthen historic maritime cultural and economic ties among countries along the Indian Ocean. It works at two levels: building new cooperation and understanding shared culture (Government of India, 2014). The Project Mausam, undertaken by the Government of India, aims to revive and enhance historic maritime cultural and economic ties among countries along the
Indian Ocean. This project is a significant step towards enhancing India’s regional soft power and cultural diplomacy.
Concerns and solidarity of Developing World
China’s reservations regarding India’s representation of global events in light of its civilization manifestation relate to the power structure within the region. China has been striving to establish internationally acceptable and negotiable norms. Its frequent tensions in the South China Sea, Southeast China, and the Pacific are also related to the US and West’s alliances, which are based on normative ideas of freedom of navigation and democratization. Its objection to the Sanskrit phrase of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ is more ideological than a matter related solely to UN language usage. Previously known as the One Belt One Road, China’s Belt and Road (BRI) Initiative, symbolized the historical Silk Route passing through China,
emphasizing a different interpretation of unity that echoes its civilization. BRI’s ambitious infrastructure and connectivity project passes through multimodal connectivity through Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Europe. The literal meaning of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ in English is “the world is family,” is taken from ancient Sanskrit text of Maha Upanishd (Kar, 2023). China could view this civilizational manifestation of India as opposed to their worldview of oneness. India does not endorse BRI as it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India considers as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
The idea of ‘Ecological Civilization’ (Shentai Wenming in Chinese) was formally discussed during the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2007, drawing on themes from Laizi’s Taoist notion of “Uniting humans and universe”. Considerable efforts have since aimed at incorporating this development concept based on a political perspective— with environmental management, ecological restoration, and green development as the primary principles—distinct from industrial and agricultural-oriented civilizations. ‘Xi’s Thoughts on Ecological Civilization’ is a book widely published by state Foreign Policy arms in English (Xue et al., 2023). These efforts reflect China’s emphasis on the alternative vision for global
civilization and ecological conservation with Chinese characteristics. The debate around Ecological Civilization focuses on environmental conservation with Chinese characteristics and its vision of balanced growth.
In January 2021, former president of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro posted an image of Lord Hanuman carrying COVID-19 vaccines to Brazil on his X account(Erstwhile Twitter), evoking the mythological figure to express gratitude to India for supplying the vaccines (Lutgendorf, 2002). Jair Bolsonaro’s post(Tweet) Invoking Lord Han This gesture reflected the geopolitical dynamics surrounding the global COVID-19 vaccine distribution, as well as the role of social media in shaping public discourse around the pandemic response. The post(Tweet) came at a critical juncture for Brazil, which was grappling with a devastating surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths during the first few months of 2021 (Galhardi et al., 2022). This incident is a compelling example of the complexities and nuances inherent in the intersection of traditional politics, mythology, and modern communication channels. Bolsonaro’s Post(Tweet)
invoked Lord Hanuman, a beloved Hindu deity known for his strength, devotion, and ability to overcome obstacles. This religious symbolism amplified the political messaging, appealing to cultural and religious sentiments within Brazil and India (Roy et al., 2021)(Oliveira et al., 2021).
India and other non-aligned countries in the Global South emphasize ‘Sustainable Development’ as a crucial norm. This concept mainly focuses on two key issues: advocating for international action on climate change and addressing environmental problems fostering development. As early as the 1970s, scholars and policymakers began to call for a more sustainable approach to development that could reconcile environmental protection with economic progress. The 1987 Brundtland Report, published by the World Commission on Environment and Development, defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Mitcham, 1995).
Developing nations have consistently criticized the Western approach to climate change through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). They prefer to address these concerns through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where they have an equal vote and voice. India’s unwavering stance against securitizing climate change is driven by its practical worries that the UNSC may use principles such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (PoC) to justify future military intervention, given that India does not hold veto power in this context (Sindico, 2017).
Meanwhile, UNFCCC, the UN specialized agency, mobilizes support for the developing world. The observers of norms in International Politics point out the cascading effort of normativity (Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K., 1998). The principle of sustainable development is at the core of climate change science. From conventions to agreements, sustainable development has been a part of binding legal regimes. Historically, sustainable development has evolved to counter the industrialized North’s climate change mitigation idea. Universal carbon cuts, displacement, and migration were the instruments of climate action in the Industrialized North (Sindico, 2017). The counter campaigns focused on the rights of developing states for development and industrialization.
The renewed debate over Global Commons has gained traction since the democratization of International Relations. India’s version of shared goods has been reflected in the ‘Panchasheel’(Five Principles) adopted in foreign policy since its independence. India became a noticeable voice in the campaign to safeguard the natural resources of the developing world in the United Nations, pressing for the Charter of Economic Rights & Duties of the State (UNGA Res. 3281, XXIX, 1974), the formation of the UN Convention on Trade and Development and the UN Industrial Development Organization (1964). The idea of shared resources and knowledge was reflected in India’s foreign policy before Global Commons gained currency in International Relations. Global Commons means the resources beyond the national sovereignty; traditional means High Seas, Polar Regions, and Outer Space. The
emergence of cyberspace has opened up newer possibilities and challenges for global commons governance. The nationalization of firewalls and Internet protocols has posed a formidable challenge for cyber governance. The control and ownership of digital resources have created a new digital divide.
It is essential that Africa forms a significant flock of global south groupings. African states have vehemently pushed for the development agenda on the floor of the United Nations. In the G20 Summit of 2023, the African Union was adopted as a permanent member of G20. This is a significant achievement of India’s campaign of global south in G20. India also rendered invitations to Nigeria, Egypt, Mauritius, the United Arab Emirates, the Netherlands, Oman, Spain, Singapore, and Bangladesh. This also reflects India’s attempt to balance North and South.
DIGITAL PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE: THE ‘INDIA STACK’
One of the significant highlights of India’s G20 Presidency was the attention that it received for the Public Digital Infrastructure (PDI). In a run-up to the G-20 Summit, DPI was part of two tracks: Digital Economy Working Group (DEWG) on the Sherpa track and Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion on the Finance Track. This indicated the unprecedented attention it gained in the run-up and was adopted in the summit’s final declaration. The most significant aspect of DPI was corroborating technology with governance and the role of communities (Varma et.al., 2024).
Apart from DPI becoming a part of the formal leader’s declaration, foreign dignitaries scouting the streets of New Delhi and making payments through the Unified Payment Interface (UPI) were all on the internet. The Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutt, who was walking on Church Street in Bangalore and paying for coffee through UPI, went viral on the internet. The instant real-time payment made the world curious about India’s rapid progress in Digital Public Infrastructure. New Delhi Declaration described DPI as: ‘Set of shared digital systems that should be secure and interoperable, and can be built on open standards & specifications to deliver and provide equitable access to public and private services at societal scale’
(G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration 2023). The document’s language points to the digital infrastructure as shared standards and resources. India’s approach to the DPI is based on the foundation of open-source, interoperable, and scalable technology with a transparent, accountable and participatory governance framework. India intends to share its DPI knowledge resources with developing states in various forums.
GLOBAL ATTENTION TO INDIA STACK
Since its inception, ‘India Stacks’ has been a vehicle for data management and economic integration. It operates in various layers: digital identification, payments, and data management. The primary layer of the India Stack is a biometrically secured digital system called AADHAR, which was established through the Aadhar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016. Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is a statutory agency under the above Act that grants 12-digit numbers to citizens. Since 2011, it has brought around 1.3 billion people to the digital repository. The Aadhar was instrumental in India’s financial inclusion programme. Central Government schemes like Pradhan
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (Jan Dhan) brought around 500 million in banking, which comprised the majority of women. It enabled identification simulations such as e-KYC (Know Your Customer), facilitating validation and registrations in institutions (Watson, 2024).
In February 2023, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Reserve Bank of India(RBI) for financial inclusion cooperation. The Prime Ministers of both countries transferred money using a phone in a photo-op, making it a human-interest story (Watson, 2024). Digital payments form the second layer of India Stacks. As of February 2024, over 12 billion transactions are completed every month through UPI (Varma et al, 2024). One of the significant features of India Stacks is its ownership structure and open-source platforms. While payment gateways such as GPay, WhatsApp Pay, Amazon Pay, and Phone Pay use their platforms to render services, the state
governs the core infrastructure. The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCL) developed the set Interoperable Protocols and governance mechanism—a not for not-for-profit government corporation. RBI regulates the NPCL, which makes a new paradigm of public-private cooperation for digital governance.
Data Empowerment & Protection Architecture (DEPA) is a consent-based data-sharing mechanism. This forms the third and 4th layer of India Stacks. Regulations state that they must obtain people’s consent before they process personal data. Fiduciaries may not access or store any data that has been shared, but they can charge for their services. This is a very different approach from those in many other countries. Elsewhere, aggregators typically offer services in exchange for access to data, which they can then use to sell other financial services (Carrière-Swallow et.al., 2021). Furthermore, in April 2024, the UN held the first Conference on ‘Citizen Stack: Digital Public Infrastructure Transformative Tech for Citizens’. UN General Assembly President Dennis Francis lauded India’s efforts to build DPI and other digital resources. The Indian delegation at the same conference made a presentation underlying the theme of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ as the basis for developing its DPI. (PTI, 2024)
LIFE
Several International initiatives on climate action evolve at the macro level. Changing behavioural patterns and practices at the societal level is a challenge. Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched Swach Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission) in 2014. Swach Bharat Abhiyan engaged various age groups in cleanliness drives and awareness programmes. The initiative tried to influence people to adopt a sustainable lifestyle. PM Narendra Modi is domestically known for his mass communications skills through various mediums. CoP26 (Conference of Parties), held in Glasgow in November 2021, appealed for the adoption of Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) at the individual level. Mission LiFE was launched as a full-fledged exercise for mass awareness. The LiFE 21 Pledge was launched, and citizens were encouraged to adopt one sustainable habit and follow it for 21 days. The initiative received global applause as the Atomic Energy Agency Executive Director Fatih Birol lauded India’s efforts to raise awareness of sustainable practices. In an Op-Ed in Indian Express, he quoted: ‘India’s G20 Presidency represents a unique opportunity to globalise the LiFE initiative — providing a knowledge-sharing platform for other leading economies to realise the impact that LiFE’s recommendations can have in the fight against climate change, air pollution and unaffordable energy bills’ (Birol, 2023).
The official website of the Government of India describes LiFE as: “An International mass movement towards mindful and deliberate cultivation, instead of mindless and destructive consumption to protect and preserve environment”. (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2023) The Mission LiFE initiative operates in three stages: the first two stages create demand and supply for sustainable practices, and in the third stage, the public policy framework takes cognizance of the new cycle and facilitates resources. It has identified seven themes, namely: Reduce waste, reduce e-waste, adopt a healthy lifestyle, adopt a sustainable food system, and say not to single-use plastic, save water and save energy (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2023).
The LiFE initiative was included in the New Delhi Declaration under the heading of the Green Development Pact for a Sustainable Future. It described LiFE as: ‘Based on the G20 High-Level Principles on Lifestyles for Sustainable Development, we commit to robust collective actions that will enable the world to embrace sustainable production and consumption patterns and mainstream Lifestyles for Sustainable Development. Relevant studies show that it could significantly reduce emissions by 2030 for a global net-zero future’ (G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration 2023). The LiFE initiative is a significant milestone in addressing climate change issues at the individual levels. The holistic nature of this exercise makes it sui-generis for climate action. The validation of New Delhi is a substantial success of India’s efforts.
INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF MILLETS
The government of India claims that millets were among the five crops to be domesticated since the Indus Valley civilization. The government of India, through its Ministry for Agriculture, had earlier declared 2018 as a National Year of Millets. It also rebranded Millets as Nutri-crops. Millets in India are grown as a Kharif crop and consume less water. In 2021, at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly 2023, the year was declared the International Year of Millets. This put India at the forefront of the celebrations. India grows around 11 million tonnes of millet, contributing to the 40% share of global millet production (APFPEDA, 2024). In December 2022, at the event International Year of Millets launch, FAO Director
General QU Dongyu stated: “Millets are incredible ancestral crops with high nutritional value. Millets can play an important role and contribute to our collective efforts to empower smallholder farmers, achieve sustainable development, eliminate hunger, adapt to climate change, promote biodiversity, and transform agri-food systems” (FAO, 2022).
CONCLUSION
India’s leadership of the G20 Summit underscored a focus on inclusivity and providing a platform to address issues relevant to the Global South. The country’s foreign policy, which adopted Non-Alignment during the Cold War, and its position on strategic autonomy are gaining resonance. By securing a broader consensus on the Leader’s Declaration, India has positioned itself as a leader in fostering consensus building. Prime Minister Modi’s statement, “Today’s era is not of war”, during his conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit (2022), was mentioned in the official communiqué of the G20 Bali Leaders’ Summit (Pandey, 2023). India balances its relations and interests with those of the global powers (Chivvis & Breiner, 2023).
India strongly advocated for African Union membership within G20 and hosted the ‘Voice of Global South Summit’ in January 2023. India’s presidency of the G20 succeeded in positioning the country as a solution provider for global challenges and the credible voice of the global south. India has been a continuous contributor of troops to UN Peacekeeping Missions throughout. India has always invoked its civilisational ethos of shared destiny, peaceful coexistence and non-violence. It has been reflected in the diplomatic cultures it disposed of. Values, Norms and Cultures have emerged as the tools of influence in International Relations. The G20 Summit was a significant assertion of its civilisation embodiment with global peace. India was represented by the name ‘Bharat’—an ancient name for the Indian subcontinent that could be interchangeably used with ‘India’.
The key factor in cultural assertion during India’s Presidency of G20 was its political communication, which coincided with its target groups of Asia and the Global South. Cultures are emerging as tools to meaning to newer geographies. India’s prowess in technological advancement is a key to the unfolding of Digital Public Infrastructure. This opens access to financial inclusivity to the people living on the margins. The entire debate around DPI revolved around India’s open-source and scalable technology. Technology has become a significant leverage for India. The phrase ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbhakam’ resonated with India’s ability to emerge as a solution provider and a consensus builder.
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27. Orazgaliyev, S., & Araral, E. (2019). Conflict and cooperation in global commons: Theory and evidence from the Caspian Sea. International Journal of the Commons, 13(2), 962–976. https://doi.org/10.5334/ijc.914
28. Pandey, V. (2023, February 28). G20: Ukraine War casts shadow over foreign ministers’ meeting in India. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-64781836
29. PIB. (2013). PM’s speech at the Foundation Stone Laying Ceremony for the Indian National Defence University at Gurgaon. Press Information Bureau.https://pib.gov.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=96146
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32. PTI. (2024, April 26). Digital Public Infrastructure has emerged as a fundamental driver of social transformation and Progress, says Unga president. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/digital-public-infrastructure-has-emerged-as-a-fundamental-driver-ofsocial-transformation-and-progress-says-unga-president/article68108848.ece#:~:text=India%20Stack%20has%20created%20a,of%20all%20digital%20transactions%20globally.
33. Roy, D., Das, M., & Deshbandhu, A. (2021, July 19). Postcolonial pandemic publics: examining social media health promotion in India during the COVID-19 crisis. Oxford University Press, 37(2). https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/daab076
34. SansadTV. (2018, January 23). PM modi addresses WEF plenary session at Davos. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quYDkMYbyTM
35. Sindico, F. (2017). Climate Change and Security. Carbon & Climate Law Review, 11(3), 187–190. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26245352
36. Singh, T. (2023, September 23). China and the G-20 Summit 2023. Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). https://www.icwa.in/show_content.phplang=1&level=3&ls_
id=9962&lid=6362#_edn2
37. Ulbert, C., Schieder, S., & Speindler, M. (2014). Social Constructivism . In Theories of International Relations (pp. 248–260). essay, Rautledge.
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41. Xue, B., Han, B., Li, H., Gou, X., Yang, H., Thomas, H., & Stückrad, S. (2023). Understanding ecological civilization in China: From political context to science. Ambio, 52(12), 1895–1909. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01897-2
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19. Lutgendorf, P. (2002, February 1). Evolving a monkey: Hanuman, poster art and postcolonial anxiety. SAGE Publishing, 36(1-2), 71-112. https://doi.org/10.1177/006996670203600104
20. MHS. (2023, July 5). Remembering Indian Navy’s humanitarian intervention: Tsunami 2004. Maritime History Society (MHS India). https://mhsindia.org/all/remembering-indian-navys-humanitarian-intervention-tsunami-2004/210035/#:~:text=’First%20Responder’%20to%20the%20disaster,five%20simultaneous%20rescue%2C%20relief%20and
21. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, G. of I. (2023). Life is a public movement to mobilize individuals to become “pro-planet people.” LiFE LiFEStyle for Environment. https://missionlife-moefcc.nic.in/
22. Mitcham, C. (1995, January 1). The concept of sustainable development: its origins and ambivalence. Elsevier BV, 17(3), 311-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-791x(95)00008-f
23. Mukharjee, V. (2023, September 7). Maharishi initiative decoded: Strengthening Millets Research Collaboration. Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/maharishiinitiative-decoded-strengthening-millets-research-collaboration-123090700542_1.html
24. NDTV. (2014, May 28). Narendra Modi’s swearing-in was like a mini SAARC summit: Bhutan prime minister to NDTV. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-KNpNCeozs
25. Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109.https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699
26. Oliveira, D L D., Moreno, E., & Lewenstein, B V. (2021, April 9). Media Representations of Official Declarations and Political Actions in Brazil During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Frontiers Media, 6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.646445
27. Orazgaliyev, S., & Araral, E. (2019). Conflict and cooperation in global commons: Theory and evidence from the Caspian Sea. International Journal of the Commons, 13(2), 962–976. https://doi.org/10.5334/ijc.914
28. Pandey, V. (2023, February 28). G20: Ukraine War casts shadow over foreign ministers’ meeting in India. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-64781836
29. PIB. (2013). PM’s speech at the Foundation Stone Laying Ceremony for the Indian National Defence University at Gurgaon. Press Information Bureau.https://pib.gov.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=96146
30. PMO, A. (2002). Former prime minister of india - Shri atal bihari vajpayee. Archives Speeches PMO. https://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9064
31. PMO, A. (2007). PM’s statement on departure to Germany for G-8 and Outreach Countries Summit : Speeches : Prime Minister of India - Dr. Manmohan Singh (May 22, 2004 - 26th May 2014). Archives PMO Speeches . https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=534
32. PTI. (2024, April 26). Digital Public Infrastructure has emerged as a fundamental driver of social transformation and Progress, says Unga president. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/digital-public-infrastructure-has-emerged-as-a-fundamental-driver-ofsocial-transformation-and-progress-says-unga-president/article68108848.ece#:~:text=India%20Stack%20has%20created%20a,of%20all%20digital%20transactions%20globally.
33. Roy, D., Das, M., & Deshbandhu, A. (2021, July 19). Postcolonial pandemic publics: examining social media health promotion in India during the COVID-19 crisis. Oxford University Press, 37(2). https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/daab076
34. SansadTV. (2018, January 23). PM modi addresses WEF plenary session at Davos. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quYDkMYbyTM
35. Sindico, F. (2017). Climate Change and Security. Carbon & Climate Law Review, 11(3), 187–190. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26245352
36. Singh, T. (2023, September 23). China and the G-20 Summit 2023. Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). https://www.icwa.in/show_content.phplang=1&level=3&ls_
id=9962&lid=6362#_edn2
37. Ulbert, C., Schieder, S., & Speindler, M. (2014). Social Constructivism . In Theories of International Relations (pp. 248–260). essay, Rautledge.
38. Venkatasubramanian, K. V. (2017, May 7). South Asian Satellite to boost regional communication. South Asian satellite to boost regional communication. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=161611
39. Varma, P., Matthan, R., Chaudhuri, R., & Madhukar, C. (2024). (rep.). The Future of Digital Public Infrastructure: A Thesis for Rapid Global Adoption. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
40. Watson, E. (2024). (rep.). The India Stack as a Potential Gateway to Global Economic Integration. Observer Research Foundation.
41. Xue, B., Han, B., Li, H., Gou, X., Yang, H., Thomas, H., & Stückrad, S. (2023). Understanding ecological civilization in China: From political context to science. Ambio, 52(12), 1895–1909. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01897-2
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